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ADDICT FIRST, CRIMINAL SECOND – ADDICTION FUELED CRIMES 
SHOULD BE INELIGIBLE FOR THE THREE-STRIKES PENALTY 
Scott Lindquist1 
INTRODUCTION 
This article is based upon the premise that drug addiction fuels crime, and that 
felonies are committed to finance habits.  Due to the nature of addiction, drugs 
must be consumed regularly and more often to not only get high, but also to pre-
vent the ill effects of withdrawal.  Those who cannot afford the financial burden of 
addiction turn to crime and many of them are repeat offenders.  In many states their 
addiction is a one-way ticket to a twenty-five years to life prison sentence under a 
repeat offender statute called the three-strikes penalty.   
The case of Gary Ewing provides an example of a repeat offender addict who 
was caught up in the sweeping nets of California’s three-strikes legislation.2  His 
story is also an example of what is wrong with repeat offender statutes.  Gary Ew-
ing needed rehabilitation not life incarceration.  Like many others, life without ad-
diction could have meant a life without crime.    
In this article I will argue that addicts who finance their addiction through 
crime should be ineligible to receive a prison sentence under a recidivist statute 
like the three strikes penalty.  Part I introduces the problem, addiction and crime 
among current prisoners reported by the Department of Justice.  Part II discusses 
Gary Ewing, an addict, a criminal, and a third strike offender.  The story of Gary 
Ewing represents the injustices levied upon an addict/criminal by enhanced sen-
tenced statutes like the three-strikes penalty.  Part III is a discussion of the history 
of repeat offender statutes, primarily focusing on the inception of California’s 
three-strikes policy and its later modification.  Part IV is an analysis of the relation-
ship between the theories of punishment and the three strikes policy and, more im-
portantly, how these models do not fit the addict/criminal.  Part V is a discussion of 
the various constitutional issues that surround the three-strikes penalty.  Part VI 
discusses both the various statutory and the medical community’s definitions of 
addiction.  Part VII explores defenses that are not available to the addict/criminal, 
but should be.  Lastly, Part VIII discusses why breaking the cycle among family 
generations is so important and the statistics that support this proposition.  This 
section also discusses treatment, the important role it plays in breaking this cycle, 
why treatment is failing in the country’s penal systems, and the ultimate cost bene-
fit of treatment compared to incarceration. 
 ________________________  
 1. J.D. Candidate, 2010, Barry University Dwayne O. Andreas School of Law; M.S. 2001, Quinnipiac 
University; B.S. 1999, Quinnipiac University. 
 2. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003). 
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I. ADDICTION AND CRIME 
A. The Government’s Statistics Argue Against Imprisonment 
In 2007, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) reported that fifty-three percent 
of state prisoners in 2004 met the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Dis-
orders criteria for drug abuse or addiction compared with two percent of adult 
United States residents.3  Of those meeting the criteria for drug abuse or addiction, 
more than half had at least three prior sentences, ranging from probation to incarce-
ration, compared with thirty-two percent of non-abusers.4  Among male arrestees in 
2003, sixty-seven percent tested positive for cocaine, marijuana, methampheta-
mine, opiates, or PCP.5  At the time of the offense, thirty-two percent of prisoners 
said they were under the influence of drugs, and almost twenty-three percent of 
those prisoners reported they were specifically under the influence of any combina-
tion of cocaine, crack, heroin, opiates, amphetamines, or methamphetamine.6  Six-
ty-nine percent of state prisoners also reported that they regularly used drugs, and 
sixty-one percent of those prisoners stated they used any combination of cocaine, 
crack, heroin, opiates, amphetamines, or methamphetamine.7 
Addicts have an increasingly greater and perpetual need to feed their addiction.  
For those addicts who do not have family, friends, and jobs, or who have simply hit 
rock bottom, there are few options in obtaining the financial resources required to 
feed their addiction.  For many of these addicts, crime pays.  The nature of their 
addiction makes addicts easy targets for prosecution and long prison sentences 
under repeat offender statutes. 
B. Paying for the Addiction 
In 2004, individuals under the influence of drugs committed more than thirty-
eight percent of the property offenses.8  A DOJ report published in 1999 indicates a 
more troubling picture when prisoners were asked about alcohol abuse.  Fifty-three 
percent of state prisoners reported using drugs or alcohol at the time of the property 
offense.9  A staggering sixty-four percent of property offenses occurred within a 
month of the state prisoner’s drug use.10  Less than twenty percent of state prison-
ers reported money for drugs as the reason for committing their crime; however, 
 ________________________  
 3. CHRISTOPHER J. MUMOLA & JENNIFER C. KARBERG, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DRUG USE AND 
DEPENDENCE, STATE AND FEDERAL PRISONERS, 2004 1, 7 (rev. ed. 2007), available at 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/dudsfp04.pdf. 
 4. Id. at 1. 
 5. ZHIWEI ZHANG, NAT’L OPINION RESEARCH CTR., DRUG AND ALCOHOL USE AND RELATED MATTERS 
AMONG ARRESTEES 6 (2003), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/nij/adam/ADAM2003.pdf. 
 6. MUMOLA & KARBERG, supra note 3, at 2. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. at 5. 
 9. CHRISTOPHER J. MUMOLA, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND TREATMENT, STATE AND 
FEDERAL PRISONERS, 1997 3 (1999) (There was not a significant change between the 1997 and the 2004 survey.), 
available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/satsfp97.pdf.  
 10. MUMOLA & KARBERG, supra note 3, at 5. 
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thirty percent of those incarcerated for a property offense stated money for drugs as 
their motive.11  Consistently, since 1991, a third of state prisoners reported using 
drugs at the time of the offense.12 
Excluding those arrested for drug crimes, forty-five percent of second and third 
“strikers” committed robbery and property crimes in California.13  Applying the 
national state prison statistics of those who stated money for drugs as their motive, 
California conceivably incarcerated approximately 5,500 drug addicts.14  Of those, 
more than 4,300 individuals committed their second strike and 1,236 individuals 
committed their third strike and were subsequently sentenced to a term of twenty-
five years to life in prison.15  California courts are not blind to these statistics, and 
in one, third strike case the court stated, “He is an addict who finances his habit by 
theft and burglary.”16   
II. THE CASE OF GARY EWING 
On March 12, 2000, Gary Ewing was arrested after walking out of the pro shop 
of the El Segundo Golf Course with three golf clubs hidden in his pants; the prop-
erty’s value was approximately $1,200.17  Ewing was subsequently convicted of 
felony grand theft in excess of $400 and sentenced to twenty-five years to life in 
prison under California’s three-strikes law.18   
Ewing’s criminal history began sixteen years earlier, in 1984, at the age of 
twenty-two when he was charged for theft.19  Between the years of 1988 and 1993, 
Ewing was convicted of grand theft auto, petty theft, battery, theft, burglary, pos-
session of drug paraphernalia (1993), appropriating lost property, unlawfully pos-
sessing a firearm, and trespassing.20  In late 1993, Ewing burglarized a California 
apartment complex, stole a VCR, forced a mailroom clerk to hand over his wallet, 
and took another resident’s money and credit cards.21  When Ewing was arrested in 
 ________________________  
 11. Id. at 6. 
 12. Id. at 2; MUMOLA, supra note 9, at 3. 
 13. ARTHUR CHUNG & JAY ATKINSON, CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. AND REHAB., SECOND AND THIRD STRIKERS 
IN THE INSTITUTION POPULATION 3–4 (2005) (Assuming that a percentage of robbery crimes were committed due 
to drug use.  A Second Striker, “is an inmate who has one prior serious or violent felony conviction pled and 
proven in court who is convicted of a new offense – which results in the new term being doubled.”  A Third Strik-
er, “is an inmate who has two or more prior serious or violent convictions pled and proven in court and who is 
convicted of any new offense – that minimum term is tripled, or is twenty-five years, or is determined by the court 
pursuant to Section 1170 for the underlying conviction, including any enhancement and the maximum term is 
Life.”), available at 
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Reports_Research/Offender_Information_Services_Branch/Quarterly/Strike1/STRIKE1d0
506.pdf.   
 14. Id. (Thirty percent multiplied by 18,394 second and third strikers). 
 15. Id.; DAVID B. ROTTMAN & SHAUNA M. STRICKLAND, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STATE COURT 
ORGANIZATION 2004 241 (2006), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/sco04.pdf.  
 16. People v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 364, 380 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995), abrogated by People v. San 
Diego County Superior Court, 892 P.2d 804 (Cal. 1995). 
 17. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 17–18. 
 18. Id. at 19–20. 
 19. Id. at 18. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 18–19. 
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December 1993, he was found with a crack pipe.22  Ewing was sentenced to nine 
years and eight months in prison for his offenses.23 
Ewing appears to be just another bad apple that cannot seem to follow society’s 
rules.  The Amici’s brief to the United States Supreme Court regarding the consti-
tutionality of California’s three-strike’s law categorizes Ewing as one of “those 
who are beyond deterrence and repeatedly commit crime” and “should be incapaci-
tated for a lengthy period in order to protect society.  Arguments to the contrary are 
counterintuitive.”24   
On the surface, Ewing appears to be an individual who cannot conform to the 
laws of society.  However, instead of examining the crimes in isolation, Ewing’s 
motivations behind the crimes must themselves be questioned.  Gary Ewing was a 
drug addict and addiction fueled his crimes.25  Gary Ewing is a prime example of 
why punishments that focus on deterrence do not work.  Incapacitation is success-
ful only in the sense that addicts like Gary Ewing are forcibly kept off the streets 
and kept from taking drugs.  Incapacitation short of a life sentence only delays the 
underlying forces of addiction.  Addicts are not cured nor deterred by imprison-
ment.  The only solution for addiction is treatment.    
The courts are aware of the addiction issues, but instead of resolving the under-
lying addiction, they punish the actions that are a result of addiction. These are 
actions addicts do not have the power to control.  Addiction is not given its day in 
court.  This is an unfathomable reality considering the United States spends billions 
of dollars fighting a war on drugs in this and other countries every year.  Ignoring 
the grasp of drug addiction is like saying social smokers are financially supporting 
the tobacco industry.   “Arguments to the contrary are[,]” in fact, intuitive.26   
III. THREE-STRIKES HISTORY 
The Federal government was the first to enact a mandatory enhanced sentence 
statute by passing the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984.27  The statute mandated 
a fifteen-year prison term for anyone illegally possessing a firearm and having 
three previous convictions for robbery or burglary.28  The state of Washington was 
the first state to pass an enhanced sentence statute under the three-strikes model in 
1993.29  Months later, in 1994, California followed by passing its own three-strikes 
 ________________________  
 22. Id. at 19. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Brief of The Criminal Justice Legal Found. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting  Respondents, Ewing v. 
California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003) (No. 01-6978), 2002 WL 1808702. 
 25. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 18–19 (noting that as early as 1993 there were signs that Ewing was suffering from 
a drug addiction). 
 26. Brief for Respondents, supra note 24, at 18. 
 27. Brief for United States at 5, Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) (No. 88-7194), 1989 WL 
434124. 
 28. Id.; Begay v. United States, 128 S. Ct 1581, 1583 (2008) (The Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984 was 
replaced by The Career Criminal Amendment Act of 1986 which included enhanced penalties for illegal posses-
sion of a firearm by anyone who had three previous convictions for robbery, a serious drug offense, or a violent 
felony.). 
 29. JOHN CLARK ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THREE STRIKES AND YOU’RE OUT: A REVIEW OF STATE 
LEGISLATION 1 (1997). 
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legislation.30  While each of the two states enacted slightly different versions of 
“three-strikes”, both sets of legislation required prison sentences up to life without 
the possibility of parole after committing three felonies.31  Between the years of 
1993 and 1995, twenty-four states enacted some type of three-strikes legislation.32  
Many states already had habitual offender laws on the books, but these laws did not 
require mandatory sentences.33  South Dakota had a similar three-strikes provision 
since 1877.  However, most of the new three-strikes provisions included mandated 
sentences.34  Some states have specific felonies that count as a strike while others, 
such as North Dakota, permit any Class A, B, or C felony to count as a strike.35   
California’s three-strikes law was considered the broadest and the harshest of 
the various three-strikes statutes enacted around the country.36  While an offender’s 
first two strikes needed to meet any one of the felonies on the State’s list of “strike-
able” violent or serious felonies, the third strike could be for any felony convic-
tion.37  As a result of California’s sweeping three-strikes legislation, many drug and 
other non-violent offenders were incarcerated, quickly filling California’s prisons.   
Mark Klass, the father of Polly Klass, was originally a major supporter of the 
three-strikes initiative.38  Polly Klass was abducted and later killed just prior to the 
passing of California’s three-strikes law by a repeat offender who would have been 
imprisoned by three-strikes if the law had previously existed; thus, the law would 
have spared Polly’s life had it been enacted prior to the time of her murder.39  Mark 
Klass subsequently withdrew his support for three-strikes after learning that non-
violent offenders were eligible for the three-strikes penalty.40  Years later, and after 
failing to get taxpayer support for a multimillion dollar prison bill, California 
passed Proposition 36, which rendered drug offenders ineligible for the three-
strikes penalty.41  Under Proposition 36, arrestees convicted of possession and drug 
use cannot initially be sentenced to time in prison.42  The new law mandates these 
individuals first receive probation and drug treatment.43 
Other states have recently adopted a similar initiative, thus excluding some 
drug crimes from the three-strikes penalty.44  Offenders who commit felony crimes 
to support their habit are still eligible for a three-strikes conviction.45 
 ________________________  
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 5. 
 32. Id. at 1. 
 33. Id. at 2. 
 34. Id. at 2, 13. 
 35. Id. at 8. 
 36. Id. at 3. 
 37. Id. at 2; Michael Vitiello, “Three Strikes” and the Romeo Case: The Supreme Court Restores Democ-
racy, 30 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1643, 1647 (1997). 
 38. Vitiello, supra note 37, at 1656–60. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 1659. 
 41. Alex Ricciardulli, Getting to the Roots of Judges’ Opposition to Drug Treatment Initiatives, 25 
WHITTIER L. REV. 309, 356 (2003). 
 42. Id. at 353. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 309–10. 
 45. Id. at 353. 
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Proposition 36 and similar initiatives are an important step in the realization 
that addiction requires treatment instead of punishment.  However, these initiatives 
miss many addicts who are not caught possessing narcotics.  The addict who fin-
ances his addiction through criminal activities is still an addict, and an addict re-
quires treatment in order to cease his criminal activities. 
IV. THREE-STRIKES AND THE GOALS OF SENTENCING 
Four Utilitarian theories of punishment are considered the most important and 
have “dominate[d] American jurisprudence for most of the twentieth century.”46  
These theories are general and specific deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilita-
tion/reform.47   
General deterrence is the theory that people will not commit certain acts or 
crimes because punishment may follow when they are caught.48  General deter-
rence is also believed to work because people learn to associate another’s actions 
and the resulting consequences.49 
Specific deterrence is aimed at the criminal himself; creating fear that if he 
commits the crime again, the punishment will be severe.50  In the case of repeat 
offenders, the utilitarian principals suggest that the punishment should increase in 
severity because the individual did not learn his lesson the first time.51 
Simply put, the theory of incapacitation protects the health, welfare, and safety 
of the public by imprisoning criminals.52  The criminal is incarcerated and kept 
from committing more crimes.53   
The pure utilitarian theory implies that the punishment itself will spur reform 
in the individual.54  The more modern approach to rehabilitation and reform in-
volves some form of intervention such as therapy, medication, education, or job 
skill training, thus providing the offender with more options and chances for suc-
cess upon release.55 
Three-strikes is, without a doubt, a utilitarian punishment.  In general, three-
strikes legislation focuses squarely on deterrence, both general and specific, and on 
incapacitation.  Three-strikes aims to deter and punish the specific individual who 
committed and continues to commit felonies by enhancing the individual’s prison 
sentence.  Three-strikes also embraces incapacitation by increasing the length of 
time a felon spends in prison; especially on a third strike conviction.  Generally, 
deterrence is difficult to measure, other than to assume a decrease in crime is due to 
an effective three-strikes law.  However, three-strikes laws miss the deterrence 
 ________________________  
 46. JOSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 35 (3d ed. 2003). 
 47. Id. at 35–36. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 36. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
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target and completely ignore the utilitarian theory of reform/rehabilitation for those 
inmates whose crimes are fueled by the need to feed their addiction.  Deterrence is 
ineffective against addicts.  These people put their life at risk on a daily basis.  
Many use dirty needles, live on the streets, and go to the most dangerous neighbor-
hoods in order to get their fix.  Most have given up families, friends, food, and a 
home.  What can the judicial system and society take away from them that they 
themselves have not already given up?  Unfortunately, for these third-strike felons, 
deterrence may have failed, but incapacitation will surely succeed.   
V. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES OF THREE-STRIKES 
Three-strikes legislation has brought many constitutional issues to the fore-
front.  State v. Manussier56 examplifies many of the constitutional issues that sur-
round the three-strikes penalty.57  In Manussier,58 the appellant challenged the con-
stitutionality of Washington’s three-strikes law by means of several constitutional 
claims, including: bill of attainder, separation of powers, the Guarantee Clause, 
equal protection, due process, and cruel and unusual punishment.59 
A. Challenging Three-Strikes as a Violation of the Eighth Amendment 
The constitutionality of three-strikes is typically challenged as a violation to 
the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution.  The Eighth Amendment 
prohibits cruel and unusual punishment and applies to the states through the Four-
teenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.60  The Supreme Court in So-
lem v. Helm,61 held that disproportionate prison sentences for nonviolent felonies 
are a violation of the Eighth Amendment under cruel and unusual punishment.62  
However, the Supreme Court draws a fine line when ruling on three-strikes propor-
tionality cases.  In Rummel v. Estelle,63 the court held that since the accused had 
been imprisoned for two prior felonies, Texas was entitled “to place upon Rummel 
the onus of one who is simply unable to bring his conduct within the social norms 
prescribed by the criminal law of the State.”64  The fine line the Supreme Court 
seems to draw between these two cases is that disproportionate prison sentences 
only violate the Eighth Amendment when they are used as punishment for first 
time felony convictions.  
Gary Ewing suffered a fate similar to Rummel in front of the Supreme Court.  
The Court held that “The gravity of his offense was not merely stealing three golf 
clubs . . . rather, Ewing was convicted of felony grand theft for stealing $1,200 
 ________________________  
 56. State v. Manussier, 921 P.2d 473 (Wash. 1996). 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 479-88. 
 60. Id. at 484; U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
 61. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983). 
 62. Id. at 284. 
 63. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980). 
 64. Id. at 284. 
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worth of merchandise after previously having been convicted of at least two ‘vio-
lent’ or ‘serious felonies.’”65  Not weighing the totality of the felony convictions 
would “fail to accord proper deference to the policy judgments that find expression 
in the legislature’s choice of sanctions.”66  Is it not just as important to weigh the 
totality of Ewing’s addiction? 
B. THREE-STRIKES: A VIOLATION OF AN ADDICT’S EQUAL PROTECTION 
RIGHTS 
An addict convicted under three-strikes could conceivably challenge the consti-
tutionality of the law by bringing a de facto equal protection suit under the Four-
teenth Amendment, claiming the application of the law discriminates against drug 
and alcohol addicts.  “[T]he Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitu-
tion guarantee[s] that persons similarly situated with respect to the legitimate pur-
pose of law must receive like treatment.”67  In some cases, addicts are not similarly 
situated since the need to finance their addiction drives their criminal behavior.  As 
the court points out in Manussier,68 either a strict scrutiny, an intermediate scrutiny, 
or a rational basis test is utilized when analyzing equal protection claims.69  If the 
court finds that the three-strikes penalty intentionally discriminates as it is applied, 
then the court will employ the intermediate scrutiny test.70  Under this test, the 
State has the burden to prove that there is an important state interest and the en-
forcement of the three-strikes law is substantially related to that interest.  Other-
wise, the court will apply a rational basis test because, while the law does affect a 
class of people, addicts are not recognized as a suspect class requiring strict scruti-
ny.  Nor are addicts recognized as a quasi-suspect class requiring intermediate 
scrutiny.71  Under the rational basis test, a state needs only to show that three-
strikes is rationally related to the state’s goal.72  The defendant faced with over-
coming a rational basis test for the government action has the greater burden to 
show that three-strikes is arbitrarily applied.73   
Unfortunately for the addict sentenced under three-strikes, an equal protection 
argument will fail.  A court will likely apply the rational basis test to a de facto 
equal protection claim, and without proof of intentional statutory discrimination the 
law will stand.  Maybe the question should not be “Does the state have a rational 
basis?”, but rather “What rational basis does the state have for imprisonment versus 
rehabilitation?” when applying the three-strikes law to addict/criminals.  Posing the 
question in the latter way strikes at the heart of the issue because the state’s goal in 
dealing with addicts should be rehabilitation and not incarceration. 
 ________________________  
 65. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 28. 
 66. Id. at 29. 
 67. Manussier, 921 P.2d at 482; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 68. Manussier, 921 P.2d at 482. 
 69. Id. at 482–83 (citing State v. Shawn, 122 Wash. 2d 553, 560 (1993) (en banc)). 
 70. Id. at 483. 
 71. Id. at 483. 
 72. Manussier, 921 P.2d at 483 (citing State v. Coria, 120 Wash. 2d 156, 171 (1992)). 
 73. Id. 
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VI. A DEFINITION FOR ADDICTION SHARED BY BOTH THE MEDICAL AND 
LEGISLATIVE COMMUNITIES PRESENTLY ELUDES THIS COUNTRY. 
The medical community’s definition is based upon symptoms and diagnosis, 
while the legislative community’s focuses mainly on the illegality of substances, 
the resulting harm to oneself, family, and the community at large.74  The issue is 
that, with some exceptions, lawmakers do not make good doctors.  Addiction, and 
proper treatment, should be identified and handled by a specialist in the medical 
community and not by a government entity.   
A. Addiction: The Medical Definition 
The medical community differentiates between substance abusers and those 
who are addicted to substances.75  An addict, over time, will experience an in-
creased tolerance to the drug and will continually need to increase the amount tak-
en in order to achieve a high.76  An addict will also lose control with the particular 
substance he or she is using.77  A substance abuser will not experience either of 
these effects.78  Addiction is defined by the American Psychiatric Association as 
substance abuse that leads to impairment or distress created by any three of seven 
specific factors over a twelve-month period.79  These factors include: tolerance, 
withdrawal, taking the drug in larger quantities or for a longer period of time than 
planned, unsuccessful efforts to reduce the amount of the drug, the amount of time 
spent acquiring the drug, whether once important activities are abandoned, and 
ignoring health problems likely caused by using the drug.80  The World Health 
Organization also defines addiction with six similar factors.81 
B. Addiction: Various Statutory Definitions 
Every state appears to define addiction differently and many of them ignore the 
medical community’s definition.82  Several states focus on the negative effects of 
addiction while some states have definitions similar to the medical definition.83  
For example, Iowa turns its attention on an addict’s behavior.84  A “substance ab-
user” is someone who “habitually lacks the self-control” to not use a drug to the 
point where “a person’s health is substantially impaired or endangered or that per-
son’s social or economic function is substantially disrupted.”85  Confusingly, 
 ________________________  
 74. 51 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts § 3 (2008).    
 75. Id.    
 76. Id. 
 77. Id.    
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id.    
 82. 51 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts § 3 (2008).   .    
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id.; IOWA CODE ANN. § 125.2(17) (West 2008). 
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Iowa’s statute further differentiates “substance abuser” from “chemical dependen-
cy” by defining chemical dependency as, “[A]n addiction or dependency, either 
physical or psychological, on a chemical substance.”86  Minnesota, Nevada, Illi-
nois, and the District of Columbia define addiction similarly to Iowa’s definition of 
substance abuser.87  California simply criminalizes addiction in their statute by 
defining an addict as “any person, adult or minor, who is addicted to the un-
lawful use of any narcotic as defined in Division 10 of the Health and Safety 
Code.”88  Delaware’s code appears to be more medically based, but only selected 
portions of the medical community’s definition are included.89    Connecticut de-
fines an addict as “[A] person who has a psychoactive substance dependence on 
drugs as that condition is defined in the most recent edition of the ‘Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders’ of the American Psychiatric Associa-
tion.”90  Connecticut statutes are a noteworthy exception and perhaps should serve 
as a model to other states as to how to define addicts and addiction. 
The private medical community and states should work together on separating 
the addicts from the non-addicts.  The medical community can provide testing and 
parameters that can easily weed the addicts from the non-addicts.  The laws are 
written in a one size fits all manner, but addicts need specialized treatment, not a 
generic punishment.   
VII. NOT GUILTY BY REASON OF ADDICTION 
“[A]lcoholism and other drug addictions are now thought to coexist with up to 
50% of other mental disorders . . . as many as 37 percent of alcohol abusers and 53 
percent of drug abusers have at least one serious mental illness.”91  Courts, howev-
er, have maintained the common law tradition of sentencing individuals who vo-
luntarily consume an intoxicant and commit crime, because the individual knew 
what he was doing at the time of consumption.92 
A. Voluntary v. Involuntary Consumption 
The common law tradition of relieving criminal responsibility focuses on invo-
luntary consumption.93  Courts were reluctant to punish a person for their crime 
when their intoxication was the result of an unskilled doctor or the “contrivance of 
one’s enemies” because the intoxication occurred at no fault of the defendant.94  
 ________________________  
 86. § 125.2(2). 
 87. 51 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts § 3 (2008).    
 88. Id.; CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 3009 (West 2008).   
 89. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 4701(1) (2008); 51 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts § 3 (2008).    
 90. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 21a-240(19) (West 2008).   
 91. Robert Montgomery, American and Addiction. What’s it Doing to Family Law, FAMILY ADVOC., 
Summer 1991, at 18, 19.  
 92. Philip E. Hassman, Annotation, When Intoxication Deemed Involuntary so as to Constitute a Defense 
to Criminal Charge, 73 A.L.R. 3d 195, 201 (1976). 
 93. Id. at 99. 
 94. Id. at 199-200. 
10
Barry Law Review, Vol. 14, Iss. 1 [2010], Art. 7
https://lawpublications.barry.edu/barrylrev/vol14/iss1/7
Spring 2010 Addict First, Criminal Second 147 
 
When intoxication occurs as a result one’s own volition, courts are unwilling to 
relieve criminal responsibility, even in cases of “physiological-psychological com-
pulsion.”95 
The American Medical Association considered addiction a disease beginning 
in 1956, and within the last several years, physiological-psychological compulsion 
(addiction) has been argued in support of finding a defendant involuntarily intox-
icated. 96  Some courts are reluctant to characterize an addict as involuntarily intox-
icated for several reasons.  Most commonly, courts reject this idea because some 
experts disagree that addicts are compelled to use drugs or alcohol, because addic-
tion is voluntarily “contracted or nurtured”, or simply because the defendant has 
failed to prove they suffer from addiction.97  Not surprisingly, a defendant has dif-
ficulty proving he is an addict under current statutory construction.98   
The judicially created hurdles to the compulsion and the proof of addiction de-
fenses need to be overcome before courts will be more willing to accept that ad-
dicts are involuntarily intoxicated.  First, the legal community needs to revisit the 
idea that addicts are compelled to use drugs.  The medical community has made 
several advances in the last three decades regarding addiction, and the law needs to 
be refreshed as medical advances occur.  Second, addicts can easily prove they are 
addicts.  A simple blood test will not only show what drugs are in a person’s blood 
stream, but also the quantity of drugs.  An addict needs an ever-increasing amount 
of drugs to reach the same previous high, and presumably the amount of drugs in a 
person’s bloodstream correlates to the level of drug dependence.  Courts should 
have no problem admitting this evidence.  A similar test is currently used to deter-
mine someone’s blood alcohol after being arrested for suspicion of driving under 
the influence. 
While rejecting the argument that addiction should be considered involuntary 
intoxication, some courts have shown willingness to consider addiction as a miti-
gating factor when sentencing a criminal.99  In People v. Walcher,100 the court con-
sidered the defendant’s alcoholism and his alcohol related arrests over a several 
year period.101  The defendant’s death sentence for killing a man during the robbery 
of a liquor store was reduced to forty to sixty-five years in prison.102  Twenty-four 
years later, three-strikes was adopted and had the opposite effect on a repeat addict 
offender’s prison sentence.  The prison sentence was increased. 
 ________________________  
 95. Id. at 202.  The year, 1976, when this article was originally published is an important factor.  More than 
three decades later, more experts are surely to agree that an addict is “compelled” to the use of intoxicants. 
 96. Id.; Montgomery, supra note 91, at 18 (explaining alcoholism, addiction, disease, and chemical depen-
dency are terms used interchangeably in current practice).  
 97. Hassman, supra note 92, at 202.  
 98. See supra Part VI.B. 
 99. Hassman, supra note 92, at 225-26 (citing People v. Walcher, 42 Ill. 2d 159, 166–67 (1969)). 
 100. Walcher, 42 Ill. 2d at 166–67. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
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B. The Insanity Defense 
“Nothing can more strongly illustrate the popular ignorance respecting insanity 
than the proposition . . . that the insane should be punished for criminal acts, in 
order to deter other insane persons from doing the same thing.”103   
Defendants seeking to use voluntary intoxication as a valid defense typically 
do so under the guise of insanity.104 The argument is based on the premise that the 
drug intoxication causes temporary insanity; wearing off over time as the body 
metabolizes the drug.105  In the 1926 case of Prather v. Commonwealth,106 the de-
fendant, accused of the fraudulent conversion of trust funds, was once a reputable 
real estate agent who became a morphine addict after an operation.107  An expert 
testified in his defense, stating “he was insane and without moral or mental respon-
sibility[.]”  The expert witness went on to testify that an addict may have the in-
stinct of right and wrong, but “will feel justified in pursuing any line of conduct 
that will enable him to procure the drug.”108  Following that testimony, the court 
stated it is “common knowledge” that a drug user who wants to quit using, but can-
not resist the urge, is not acting “voluntarily in its continued use.”109  Furthermore, 
the court opined “[S]uch an addict is insane and will commit any character of crime 
to obtain the drug and is utterly irresponsible for such acts.  If such insanity actual-
ly exists the responsibility for the commission of such a crime is not to be distin-
guished from that of other insane persons.”110   
Since then, courts have struggled with addiction and the insanity defense due to 
the classification of addiction and its application under the Model Penal Code, the 
Durham, and the M’Naghten insanity tests.111  The Model Penal Code requires the 
conduct associated with the crime to be the result of mental disease or defect, a 
lack of substantial capacity to appreciate the “wrongfulness” of the conduct, or 
lacks the substantial capacity to conform to the law.112  Under the Durham test, the 
conduct must be shown to be a result of mental disease or defect.113  The right-
wrong insanity test of M’Naghten relieves criminal responsibility if the defendant 
can prove that he suffered a defect of reason “from a disease of the mind, as to not 
know the nature and quality of the act he was doing or if he did know it, he must 
 ________________________  
 103. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 668 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring) (quoting ISAAC RAY, 
TREATISE ON THE MEDICAL JURISPRUDENT OF INSANITY 56 (5th ed. 1871)). 
 104. Phillip E. Hassman, Annotation, Effect of Voluntary Drug Intoxication upon Criminal Responsibility, 
73 A.L.R. 3d 98, 106 (1976). 
 105. Id. 
 106. Prather v. Commonwealth, 287 S.W. 559, 559 (Ky. 1926), overruled by Commonwealth v. Tate, 893 
S.W.2d 368 (Ky. 1995). 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 559–60.  
 109. Id. at 560. 
 110. Id. (emphasis added). 
 111. Phillip E. Hassman, Annotation, Drug Addiction or Related Mental State as Defense to Criminal 
Charge, 73 A.L.R. 3d 16, 81-84 (1976). 
 112. Id. at 60. 
 113. Id. at 64. 
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not have known he was doing that which was wrong.”114  The heart of the court’s 
difficulty turns on whether addiction is a “mental disease or defect.”115 
The common law jurisprudence, along with the Model Penal Code, Durham, 
and M’Naghten insanity tests, wrongly ignore the overwhelming compulsion an 
addict experiences.  All fail because a standard definition of addiction eludes the 
courts.  Promisingly, a defendant may be able to rely on the insanity plea in the 
future should addiction be definitively determined to be a “mental disease or de-
fect.”116   Until the courts recognize that addiction is in fact a disease, the insanity 
defense will remain unavailable to those who commit crimes to finance their addic-
tion. 
VIII. BREAKING THE CYCLE 
In 1999, more than half of all state prisoners reported having children under the 
age of eighteen affecting approximately 1.5 million children.117  Twenty-two per-
cent of these children are under the age of five years old;118 many of them will not 
be reunited with their parent until after the age of seventeen.119  The majority of 
prison inmates with children reported using drugs in the month prior to their crime, 
and many others reported a history of alcohol dependence.120  The vast majority of 
this population does not have a high school diploma.121  One-fifth of fathers and 
one-third of mothers reported they committed their crime to get drugs or money for 
drugs.122  Chances are that many of these inmates at one time had a family member 
in prison.123  State prison statistics indicate that twenty-four percent of drug depen-
dent or abusing inmates reported they once lived in a home where a parent or guar-
dian abused alcohol, drugs, or both, and more than half reported having a family 
member incarcerated.124  Even more shocking, prisoners who reported having a 
father who was incarcerated at one time were almost twice as likely to be addicted 
to drugs than those prisoners whose fathers had never been incarcerated.125 
Many addicted prisoners share similar personal histories, which may be factors 
in determining who in the future is susceptible to a similar fate.126 Prisoners meet-
ing the definition for drug abuse/dependence were more than twice as likely to be 
homeless within the prior year compared to those inmates who were not addicted to 
 ________________________  
 114. Id. at 71. 
 115. Id. at 64. 
 116. Id. 
 117. CHRISTOPHER J. MUMOLA, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INCARCERATED PARENTS AND THEIR CHILDREN, 
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ 182335 1 (2000), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/iptc.pdf. 
 118. Id.  
 119. Id. at 6. 
 120. Id. at 1 (sixty percent of parents reported using drugs in the month prior to their current offense and 
twenty-five percent reported a history of alcohol dependence). 
 121. Id. (seventy percent of prisoners with children never earned a high school diploma).  
 122. Id. at 8. 
 123. MUMOLA & KARBERG, supra note 3, at 8 (The statistics suggest that more than ninety percent of state 
prisoners had a family member who was incarcerated at some time and more than half are addicts.).  
 124. Id.  
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
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drugs, almost fourteen percent versus six percent.127  While growing up, forty-two 
percent received some type of public assistance, forty-five percent reported living 
with only one parent, and twenty-three percent reported being physically or sexual-
ly abused.128  These individuals are without a doubt drugging or drinking to mask 
their psychological issues.  These individuals require counseling, not state correc-
tions. Punishing addicts under three-strikes does nothing to alleviate this cycle; in 
fact, if the statistics are correct, three-strikes only perpetuates the cycle.  If the 
cycle does not already exist within a family, imprisoning someone has the potential 
of creating the very cycle that needs to be prevented.  Imprisonment creates single 
parent families, can force a child into foster care, and may require the family to 
seek public assistance if the breadwinner is locked up.  A parent committed to pris-
on for twenty-five years to life is unlikely to see their children ever again.  Most 
inmate-parents never even get a visit from their children while incarcerated be-
cause the inmates are detained more than one hundred miles from where they last 
lived.129   
A. Treatment Is Essential To Reducing Recidivism and Future Drug Use 
The failure to treat addiction in prison is highly associated with recidivism.130  
Half of drug abusing offenders return to prison within eighteen months of their 
release and almost three-quarters will recidivate within three years of their re-
lease.131  One study revealed that inmates with a high number of prior convictions 
are disproportionately more likely to be addicted to heroin or crack than a first time 
offender.132  Almost all of these prisoners return to drug use after three years.133   
B. Prison Rehabilitation Is Ineffective 
In 2004, less than half of the prisoners who met the criteria for drug depen-
dence or abuse attended treatment or other drug program offered in prison.134  On 
the surface this percentage looks promising, but less than half of those inmates 
actually received treatment.135  Most other inmates attended self-help groups, peer 
counseling, or a drug education program.136  Even worse, these programs are not 
 ________________________  
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. MUMOLA, supra note 117, at 1 (fifty-seven percent of fathers and fifty-four percent of mothers reported 
never receiving a visit from their children, and sixty percent report being in a prison more than 100 miles from 
their home).  
 130. Joesph A. Califano Jr., A New Prescription, Investing in Substance-Abuse Treatment Would Take a Big 
Bite Out of Crime, WASH. MONTHLY, Oct. 1 1998, available at 1998 WLNR 7836351.  
 131. Ricciardulli, supra note 41, at 337.  
 132. Califano, supra note 130 (The state prison study showed that inmates with five or more previous con-
victions are seven times more likely to be addicted to heroin and three times more likely to be addicted to crack 
than first offenders.).    
 133. Ricciardulli, supra note 41, at 337-38.     
 134. MUMOLA & KARBERG, supra note 3, at 8.  
 135. Id. at 9 (fifteen percent received treatment, such as residential facility or unit, counseling by a profes-
sional, detoxification unit or maintenance drug).  
 136. Id. 
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working.  Two-thirds of those who participated in past prison programs were under 
the influence of drugs or alcohol at the time of their most recent offense.137  These 
statistics support the opinion that prisons make ineffective drug treatment cen-
ters.138  The intensity, duration, and the lack of personally tailored prison programs 
provide are often cited as reasons why treatment is failing.139  
C. Drug Diversion Courts 
A recent success in the battle against the high number of drug recidivists is due 
to the innovation of drug diversion courts, sometimes referred to as Drug Treat-
ment Courts (DTC).140  Over a four-year period, arrestees who participated in the 
nation’s first drug court in Miami, were rearrested at a rate of three percent com-
pared to thirty percent of those with similar crimes and who did not participate in 
the DTC.141 Other DTC jurisdictions have reported a similar decline in recidiv-
ism.142  While Miami’s DTC handles approximately twenty percent of all drug of-
fense cases,143 some DTCs have adjudicated only a small fraction of cases in their 
jurisdiction.144 
Among drug diversion courts there are several similar elements, however, there 
is no element more important than the focus on rehabilitation and not on incarcera-
tion.145  DTCs also share similar requirements on who is eligible for drug treat-
ment.146 DTCs will only hear drug crime cases, specifically excluding those who 
have a history of felonies or violence.147  These courts are also excluding those who 
may need treatment the most - the destitute who commit crimes to support their 
habit.   
 ________________________  
 137. MUMOLA, supra note 9, at 9 (almost sixty percent of intoxicated recidivists had participated some sort 
of addiction program while previously incarcerated; twenty-seven percent previously received treatment and forty-
one percent previously participated in other drug and alcohol programs). 
 138. James R. Brown, Drug Diversion Courts: Are They Needed and Will They Succeed in Breaking the 
Cycle of Drug-Related Crime? 23 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 63, 77–78 (1997).  
 139. Id. at 82. 
 140. Id. at 93; Peggy Fulton Hora, et al., Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Drug Treatment Court Move-
ment: Revolutionizing the Criminal Justice System’s Response to Drug Abuse and Crime in America, 74 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 439, 440 (1999). 
 141. Hora, et al., 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. at 454-56 (Miami’s DTC processed 4,500 individuals, two-thirds 
of those remained in treatment or graduated.  Of the 1,700 individuals who graduated, only three percent were 
rearrested within a year). 
 142. Id. at 485, 489–94 (in a national survey, Miami’s DTC participants recidivated at a rated of ten percent  
within one year, thirteen percent  within eighteen months and twenty-four percent within five years of graduating.  
Miami officials estimate that sixty percent of non-participants recidivate. Baltimore reported a fourteen percent re-
arrest rate and a three percent conviction rate for DTC participants, and Oakland Municipal Court reports a fifty 
percent decrease in recidivism). 
 143. Id. at 484. 
 144. Ricciardulli, supra note 41, at 342 (some DTCs are handling 2% to 5% of drug crime cases). 
 145. Hora, et al., supra note 140, at 453. 
 146. Id. at 507–08. 
 147. Id. at 482, 507-08 (Miami excludes anyone with two or more non-drug felony convictions, the program 
in Queens, New York prohibits anyone with any felony convictions and Portland, Oregon’s program excludes 
those with felony convictions or a Class A misdemeanor.  All three jurisdictions exclude offenders with a history 
of violence). 
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Critics of the ineffective and costly war on drugs and taxpayers alike are em-
bracing the rehabilitation model.148  The rehabilitation model focuses on shutting 
down the demand for drugs, instead of intercepting drug supplies.149  Generally, a 
year of DTC costs between $900 and $6,500 per person, compared to an average of 
$23,000 a year per prison inmate.150  The Dallas Divert Court estimates that for 
every one dollar spent on rehabilitation, society saves almost ten dollars in costs 
over a forty- month treatment plan.151 
Applying some of these costs to thirty percent of California’s three-strikers, the 
cost of incarcerating these individuals for life is astronomical.152  California will 
spend an estimated $1.4 billion to punish those who may otherwise be rehabili-
tated.153  Each inmate could spend 177 years in treatment for the cost it takes to 
lock him or her up for the rest of his or her life.154   
Gary Ewing, upon whom this article is loosely based, is an example of the fail-
ure of the deterrence theory of punishment as applied to addicts.  Rather, he would 
have benefited from drug treatment if his addiction were recognized in 1993 when 
he was arrested for drug paraphernalia.  When Gary Ewing was convicted under 
three-strikes in 2000, he suffered from AIDS, drug addiction, loss of sight in one 
eye, and had recently lost his mother and brother.155   
Should Gary Ewing live to the age of seventy-five, California citizens will pay 
approximately $1.3 million for his incarceration.156  With that cost, Gary Ewing 
could have attended treatment for 207 years, but only a small fraction of that time 
would have been needed to rehabilitate and educate him. 157   This may have possi-
bly prevented him from contracting HIV, and in return, producing a citizen who 
could have contributed to society.   
 ________________________  
 148. Michael Vitiello, Three Strikes: Can We Return to Rationality?, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 395, 
449–50 (1997). 
 149. Id. at 450.  
 150. Hora, et al., supra note 140, at 503; see also Brown, supra note 137, at 92; Sam Torres, Should Correc-
tions Treat or Punish Substance-Abusing Criminals?, 60 FED. PROBATION 18, 22 (1996); JAMES J. STEPHEN, U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STATE PRISON EXPENDITURES, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ 202949 (June 2004) at 1, 
available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/spe01.pdf. 
 151. Thomas B. Fomby & Vasudha Rangaprasad, Divert Court of Dallas County - Cost/Benefit Analysis, at 
12 (Aug. 2002), http://faculty.smu.edu/tfomby/DivertFinal.pdf.   
 152. Thirty percent represents the percentage of criminals who commit felonies to support their addiction.  
 153. CAL. DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION, THIRD QUARTER 2008 FACT AND FIGURES, 
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Divisions_Boards/Adult_Operations/Facts_and_Figures.html, (last visited January 15, 
2009). 1,236 (30% of 2005 addicted three-strikers) X $36,000 (cost per year) X 32 (years in prison. Assumed 
maximum age of 75 - average current age is 37) = $1,423,872,000. 
 154. $36,000 (cost per year to imprison) / $6,500 (maximum cost of treatment per year) = 5.5 X 32 (years in 
prison) = 177.2 years. 
 155. Reply Brief for Petitioner Gary Ewing at 20, Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003) (No. 01-6978), 
2002 WL 31120962. 
 156. Gary Ewing was convicted at the approximate age of thirty-eight.  If he lives until the age of seventy-
five, he will have spent thirty-seven years imprisoned.  37 years X $36,000 per year = $1.3 million.   
 157. $1.3 million / $6,500 per year for treatment = 207 years of treatment.  
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IX. CONCLUSION 
Addicts who commit crimes to finance their habits should be ineligible to re-
ceive a sentence under the three-strikes policy. Three-strikes legislation seeks to 
deter individuals through enhanced sentences and the threat of long-term incapaci-
tation.  By the nature of addiction, three-strikes fails to deter addicts.  These are 
individuals who come from broken homes or who have no families at all, or who 
are homeless and hungry.  They risk life and death every day.  They risk drugs cut 
with poisons, dirty needles, overdose, and engage in prostitution.  The risks they 
take to use drugs far outweigh any sentence the legal system could ever levy upon 
them.  A prison sentence for some will provide three meals a day, a roof over their 
head, and a bed to sleep in.  This is not deterrence.  For addicts, three-strikes means 
incapacitation.  No matter how long an addict is locked up, their addiction will be 
ever present until they receive the proper rehabilitation.   
Gary Ewing represents one of many who are addicted to drugs, commit felo-
nies to finance their addictions, and are sentenced to twenty-five years to life under 
three-strikes.  Three-strikes has a place in our legal system, but it needs fine-tuning.  
The legal and the medical communities need to work in conjunction to define ad-
diction, signs of addiction, and to figure out what really occurs when an addict is 
suffering from withdrawals.  Collaboration can resolve the issues that plague ad-
dicts and the law.  States should appropriately and effectively write laws with very 
specific goals regarding addiction.  Laws can be preventive and not reactive written 
to reflect a focus on rehabilitation and not on punishment.  Addicts will not only 
get the help they need, but they will also have a valid defense under the law.  
Whether this defense is involuntary intoxication, temporary insanity, or a disease 
of the mind, a concrete definition of addiction will clarify an acceptable defense 
that eludes addicts today. 
Research indicates that children who grow up in single parent homes, homes 
where addiction is a problem, or in homes where a family member has been incar-
cerated are not only more likely to become addicts themselves, but are also more 
likely to be put behind bars.  Three-strikes perpetuates this cycle.  This cycle needs 
to be broken.  The system is throwing away the key on individuals who can be 
helped, educated and returned to society where they can raise their children, enter 
the workforce and become a benefit to society.   
In some cases, crime is product of addiction.  Resolve the addiction and the 
crime will cease.  Addiction fueled crimes should be ineligible for the three-strikes 
penalty. 
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